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NULLIFICATION AT WORK? A GLIMPSE FROM THE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS STUDY OF
HUNG JURIES*
PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR** AND VALERIE P. HANS***
INTRODUCTION
In the November 2002 elections, South Dakota voters had an
opportunity to amend their state constitution to permit criminal
defendants to argue to a jury that the law with which they are charged
should be disregarded. The proposed constitutional amendment
would have allowed the accused in all criminal prosecutions to argue
the "merits, validity, and applicability of the law."1 In practical terms,
the amendment explicitly encouraged jurors in criminal cases to
engage in jury nullification-that is, to render an acquittal in a
criminal case in disregard of the governing law and the weight of the
evidence. The pre-election debate on this ballot initiative generated
national public interest 2 about a topic that has been simmering quietly
* The research reported here was supported by National Institute of Justice Grant No.
98-IJ-CX-0048 to the National Center for State Courts. Points of view are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the National Institute of Justice or the
National Center for State Courts.
** Staff Attorney & Principal Court Research Consultant, National Center for State
Courts.
*** Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware; Research
Affiliate of the National Center for State Courts.
1. The pertinent text of Constitutional Amendment A, proposing to modify Article VI,
Section 7 of the South Dakota Constitution was: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right... to argue the merits, validity, and applicability of the law, including the
sentencing laws."
2. For a sampling of news coverage of the amendment and the issue of jury nullification,
see A South Dakota Initiative The Nation Should Worry About, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 2, 2002, at
16; Bruce Fein, Sabotaging the Rule of Law, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at A16; Joe Kafka,
South Dakota Ballot Measure Allows Defendants To Tell Jury They Can Ignore the Law,
ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Sept. 22, 2002; Joe Kafka, S. Dakota Measure
Alarms Legal Profession; Would Allow Juries Some Latitude To Nullify Laws, THE RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 23, 2002; Adam Liptak, A State Weighs Allowing Juries to Judge
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at Al; Brian Naylor & Joshua Welsh, Proposed Amendment
in South Dakota Asks Juries To Judge the Law Itself, NAT'L PUB. RADIO WEEKEND EDITION,
Oct. 13, 2002; Null and Void: Jury Nullification Flies in the Face of Justice, Fairness, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 2002; Gary Young, South Dakotans To Vote on Jury Nullification Proposal:
A NonLawyer A.G. Candidate's Crusade, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21,2002.
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in judicial and legal policy discussions for some time and fueling
concerns in the criminal justice community that jury nullification is on
the rise.3
Ultimately, the amendment was defeated-68,620 in favor versus
246,040 against,4 a resounding 78% margin which in the electoral
context of majority take-all is fairly characterized as a rout. But jury
nullification is, in essence, a counter-majoritarian measure. It permits
a small minority of citizens-twelve, or even fewer in some jurisdic-
tions'-to invalidate, in the context of a particular case, laws that have
been established through the legislative process. Moreover, it permits
just a single individual to temporarily thwart the imposition of the law
on a criminal defendant by deadlocking the jury and forcing a mis-
trial.6 It is intriguing that nearly one in four voters in South Dakota
favored explicit constitutional authorization for such a practice,
suggesting that at least a significant minority believes that juries
3. A number of federal and state courts have decided questions relating directly or
indirectly to jury nullification. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); United States v.
Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Dougherty, 472 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1972); People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
The academic and law review literature discussing jury nullification is substantial. For
book-length treatments, see CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A
DOCTRINE (1998); THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985); MORTIMER R.
KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL
DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973). Other books on the jury include chapters or
sections on nullification. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 57-95 (1994); NORMAN J.
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 23-41 (1995); VALERIE P.
HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 149-63 (1986). Law reviews have published a
number of articles on jury nullification. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); Mark DeWolf Howe,
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Nancy J. King, Silencing
Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
433 (1998); Andrew A. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996); Nancy
S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
285 (1999); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (1999)
[hereinafter Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury]; Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980); Alan W.
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
4. See http://www.state.sd.us/sos/results/balquest.shtml.
5. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
(holding that criminal juries of six persons do not violate the Constitution). For current jury-size
rules in state courts, see DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, at
278, tbl. 42 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf.
6. Two states, Louisiana and Oregon, permit nonunanimous verdicts in felony trials. See
LA. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 782 (West 2003) (requiring ten of twelve jurors); OR. REV.
STAT. § 136.450 (West 2001) (requiring ten of twelve jurors). The practice of nonunanimous
verdicts was upheld for state courts in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), and Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). An additional thirteen states permit nonunanimous verdicts in
misdemeanor trials. For decision rule practices among the states, see ROTTMAN ET AL., supra
note 5, at 278.
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should be entitled to consider the law's fairness when deciding a
criminal case.7
Several high-profile criminal trials in recent years have contrib-
uted to the perception that jury nullification is increasing. Many
commentators attributed O.J. Simpson's acquittal to jury nullifica-
tion.8 Several other high-profile trials that ended in acquittals or hung
juries have involved issues of sufficient public controversy such that
jury nullification could not be discounted as a factor in the disposi-
tions for those trials. For example, Lyle and Eric Menendez stood
trial on charges that they murdered their parents, and raised a con-
troversial "abuse excuse" in their own defense. Dual juries heard the
case, and both deadlocked. At the retrial, the brothers were con-
victed of first-degree murder. The jury in former D.C. Mayor Marion
Barry's trial on drug possession charges convicted on one charge,
acquitted on another, and deadlocked on the remainder. Both Susan
McDougal and Julie Hiatt Steele were tried in connection with the
Independent Counsel's investigation of President Bill Clinton. Susan
McDougal was acquitted of one charge of obstruction of justice and
the jury hung on two charges of criminal contempt. The jury in Julie
Hiatt Steale's trial hung on all four counts of lying to the FBI and to
two federal grand juries.
Some observers have suggested that racial and ethnic bias and
conflict are factors in jury nullification.9 For example, The New
Yorker published an article by Professor Jeffrey Rosen entitled "One
Angry Woman" that attributed jury deadlock in the District of
Columbia to African-American women who were unwilling to play a
part in sending another "brother" to prison.10 Professor Paul Butler
wrote a controversial article arguing that African-Americans should
acquit African-American defendants charged with nonviolent crimes
(e.g., drug offenses) as a form of political protest against sentencing
policies that have a disproportionate impact on minority defendants."
In court circles, many judges have become uneasy about the prolifera-
7. See supra note 4.
8. California v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995); see POSTMORTEM: THE
O.J. SIMPSON CASE 1, 15-18 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996).
9. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, In Jury Rooms, Form of Civil Protest Grows, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 1999, at Al.
10. Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, NEW YORKER, Feb. 24 & Mar. 3, 1997, at 54, 55.
11. See Butler, supra note 3.
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tion of organizations advocating jury nullification, such as the Fully
Informed Jury Association. 12
The criminal justice community has become increasingly con-
cerned about the policy implications of jury nullification, especially as
jury nullification manifests itself in hung juries. A number of com-
munities, especially in California, report that up to one-quarter of all
criminal jury trials routinely result in mistrials due to jury deadlock.13
Other urban areas including the District of Columbia, Manhattan,
New York, and Houston, Texas report hung jury rates in excess of
10%. 14 These numbers raise significant concerns about the monetary
costs associated with retrying cases as well as the emotional toll on
victims and witnesses and the potential public safety costs associated
with criminal defendants serving less time in prison, or no time at all,
due to the failure of the jury to convict."
In spite of increased perceptions that jury nullification is the un-
derlying motivation for acquittals and mistrials against the weight of
the evidence and law, individual reports of nullification consist
primarily of outside observers' speculations about jury motivations,
not admissions by the jurors themselves. Two possible instances of
jury nullification arose in criminal trials in which jury deliberations
were videotaped with the permission and knowledge of the courts,
parties, and jurors.' 6 However, most reports of nullification are
anecdotal; until recently, there was no systematic empirical informa-
tion about the extent to which nullification actually occurs, if at all.
12. See, e.g., Frederic B. Rogers, The Jury in Revolt? A "Heads Up" on the Fully Informed
Jury Association Coming Soon to a Courthouse in Your Area, 35 JUDGES' J. 10 (1996). FIJA is
a nonprofit, tax-exempt educational foundation that claims as its mission "to inform all
Americans about their rights, powers, and responsibilities when serving as trial jurors." In
addition, "FIJA also seeks to restore the political function of the jury as the final check and
balance on our American system of government." See http://www.fija.org.
13. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS' ASSOCIATION, NON-UNANIMOUS JURY
VERDICTS: A NECESSARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, app. C (1995) [hereinafter CAL. DIST.
ATrYS' ASS'N.].
14. See Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Much Justice Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at
Hung Jury Rates, 83 JUDICATURE 59, 65 (1999).
15. See CAL. DIST. ATrTYS' ASS'N, supra note 13, at 6-10.
16. In 1986, PBS obtained permission to videotape jury deliberations in a Wisconsin felony
trial as a feature for its public affairs documentary series Frontline, and filmed an explicit
discussion among the jurors that their verdict was motivated by their disagreement with the
application of the law, rather than evidentiary reasons. The jury acquitted the defendant.
Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986). In 1997, CBS filmed
four Arizona criminal trials, including jury deliberations. In one of the trials, a juror cited
disagreement with the fairness of the law as one reason he favored acquittal although other
jurors favored conviction; the jury was unable to reach a verdict in the case and was declared
hung. A second jury convicted the defendant. CBS Reports: Enter the Jury Room (CBS
television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1997).
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In 1998, the National Institute of Justice awarded a grant to the
National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") to examine the frequency
and various causes of hung juries.17 One of the factors that the NCSC
project staff investigated was jurors' perceptions of the fairness of the
law they were asked to apply in felony trials as well as jury and case
characteristics that are often associated with jury nullification. 18 The
project also asked judges and other court actors to rate the strength of
the evidence in the case. 19 Thus, the project enabled researchers to
examine jurors' views, the evidence, and case outcomes to explore
whether concerns about the fairness of the law led to verdicts that
were inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
In this Article, we attempt to define jury nullification, a more
complex task than it first appears. We provide a brief overview of
evolving public and legal opinion about jury nullification, and current
judicial responses to perceived instances of nullification when they
occur. We then discuss the theoretical and methodological relevance
of the NCSC study to existing questions about jury nullification.
Finally, we report the research findings of the study related to jury
nullification and discuss the policy implications of those findings for
the criminal justice community.
I. DEFINING JURY NULLIFICATION
Scholars examining the issue of jury nullification agree that de-
fining and identifying jury nullification is complex. 0 In an important
jury nullification case, United States v. Thomas, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals observed that:
We are mindful that the term "nullification" can cover a number of
distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word
conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors
may nullify, for example, because of the identity of a party, a disap-
probation of the particular prosecution at issue, or a more general
opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws.21
17. The final report for that research effort was released in September 2002. PAULA L.
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResJuriesHungJuriesPub.pdf.
18. Id. at 58.
19. Id. at 44-45.
20. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149
(1997); Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, supra note 3, at 881-87.
21. 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997).
2003] 1253
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Common to most definitions of jury nullification is that juries, or
individual members of the jury, vote to acquit the defendant although
the jurors believe that the defendant is guilty under the law. Profes-
sor Nancy Marder argues that the juror's or jury's intent is crucial:
jury nullification "requires a subjective intent by the jurors to nul-
lify. '22 That is, if jurors misunderstand or misapply the law, or
misinterpret evidence, to reach a verdict at odds with a legal rule,
they cannot be said to nullify.2 3 Marder notes that criminal juries may
disregard the law and convict, or disregard the law in civil cases, but
that in both of these situations the parties have recourse to judicial
intervention and the consequences of jury disobedience are not so
severe as in the case of a jury's criminal acquittal, which is binding on
the court.24
Professor Darryl Brown has developed a useful typology of jury
nullification that is worthwhile to consider in this context. 25 Brown
proposed four distinct categories of jury nullification, only one of
which he asserts is truly inconsistent with the rule of law. The first
category consists of acquittals rendered by the jury on grounds that
the law they are asked to apply is fundamentally unjust.26 In the
second category, nullification is a valid response to the unjust applica-
tion of an otherwise just law, for example, if the punishment upon
conviction is disproportionate to the actual offense. 27  The third
category of nullification, according to Brown, is a vote for acquittal
when the state engages in an act of misconduct that is sufficiently
egregious that the prosecution should not be rewarded with a convic-
tion, even if the law itself and its application in the case are just and
would otherwise support a conviction on the evidence. s The last
category of nullification concerns situations where a jury returns an
22. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, supra note 3, at 882.
23. Id. at 882-83.
24. Id. at 882.
25. See Brown, supra note 20.
26. The prototypical example of this category is Northern juries that routinely acquitted
abolitionists charged with violating the Fugitive Slave Act before and during the Civil War. Id.
at 1178-82.
27. Id. at 1183-91. Many commentators suggest that the imposition of severe penalties for
repeat felony offenders (e.g., California's "three strikes" law), even for relatively minor,
nonviolent crimes, have contributed to an increase in hung juries and acquittals in recent years.
But see HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 17, at 6-8; Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung
Jury: The American Jury's Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33
(2003) (suggesting that comparatively high hung jury rates have existed in California for
considerably longer than modern repeat offender statutes).
28. See Brown, supra note 20, at 1172-78.
[Vol 78:1249
NULLIFICATION AT WORK?
acquittal not because of some conscientious objection to the law, its
application, or the state's pursuit of a conviction, but rather because
of the jury's bias or prejudice in favor of the defendant or against the
prosecution.29 This, Brown argues, is the only category that is incon-
sistent with the rule of law.30
Although most commentators on jury nullification concern
themselves only with unjustified jury acquittals, others maintain that
jury nullification might also occur when juries convict rather than
acquit.3 Professor Norman Finkel, for example, argues that jury
nullification runs both ways, in a merciful direction in which jurors
acquit against the law and evidence as well as in a vengeful direction
in which jurors convict against the law and evidence.3 2 In fact, a
number of commentators warn about the potential dangers of inform-
ing jurors about their jury nullification power, as juries might be
liberated to follow their biases and prejudices rather than the evi-
dence and the law in arriving at unwarranted convictions. 3
II. EVOLVING PUBLIC AND LEGAL OPINION ABOUT JURY
NULLIFICATION
If a single word can be identified that describes historical, as well
as current, public views about the legitimacy of jury nullification, that
word is ambivalence. Many of history's most famous cases involved
trials in which the jury engaged in nullification. Bushell's Case,34 for
example, which took place in England in 1670, first established the
common-law principle that jurors cannot be punished for their
verdicts.35 That case arose from the trial of William Penn and Edward
Mead on charges of unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace while
preaching in Gracechurch Street in London.36 The jury acquitted
Penn and Mead, but was subsequently fined forty marks37 and jailed
in Newgate Prison until the fine was paid as punishment for disre-
29. Id. at 1191-96.
30. Id.
31. FINKEL, supra note 3, at 30, 32-34.
32. Id. at 30-31.
33. Id. "Blind and equal justice will give way to individualized sympathy and idiosyncratic
discretion." Id. at 31.
34. T. Jones, 13, s.c. 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009 (C.P. 1670).
35. GREEN, supra note 3, at 200.
36. Id. at 202.
37. A mark was an English and Scottish monetary unit equal to thirteen shillings and four
pence. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
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garding the court's order to return a guilty verdict.38 Bushell, one of
the jurors who purportedly led the jury to defy the court's order, later
sued the court for wrongful imprisonment, and his victory in that suit
established the common-law principle that jurors cannot be held
legally accountable for their verdicts.3 9
The principle established by Bushell's Case was incorporated into
the common law of the American colonies and the concept of jury
nullification enjoyed widespread political support by the country's
founding fathers. For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote that juries
''never exercise this power [to nullify] but when they suspect partiality
in the judges, and by the exercise of this power they have been the
firmest bulwarks of English liberty."40 Jury nullification was credited
with the August 1735 acquittal of John Peter Zenger, who was tried
for seditious libel for publishing articles in the New York Weekly
Journal that criticized William Cosby, then Royal Governor of New
York.41 Likewise, jury nullification has been the preferred explana-
tion for acquittals by Northern juries of abolitionists tried for violat-
ing the Fugitive Slave Act before and during the American Civil War,
of rumrunners and moonshiners during Prohibition, and of antiwar
protestors during the Vietnam War.42 Indeed, throughout most of
American history, such instances of jury nullification have been
heralded as courageous examples of political protest and moral
integrity.
Some of the earliest American cases involving hung juries may
reflect jury nullification. In 1843, the Southern Quarterly Review
predicted that in a dispute over a slave in the State of New York, a
hung jury was the most likely outcome:
The concurrence of all the twelve is necessary to a finding, and
there is not the remotest chance that a jury will be found, in any
38. GREEN, supra note 3, at 224-25, 236.
39. Id. at 236-49.
40. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Abbg Arnoux, 19 July 1789, in 15 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
41. See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000). Zenger was defended by Alexander Hamilton, whose
principle argument to the jury in favor of acquittal was that the indictment required the jury to
find the papers "false, scandalous, and seditious," which, as Hamilton reasoned, they could not
do because the papers were "notoriously known to be true." Id. at 49. To eliminate the basis for
such a verdict, Chief Justice James DeLancy, who presided at the trial, charged the jury to find a
special verdict of guilty on the issue of publishing the papers and to leave the question of
whether the papers were seditious for the court. Id. at 51-52. The jury promptly returned a
verdict of not guilty. Id.
42. See CONRAD, supra note 3, at 77-84, 108-15, 124-27.
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part of that State [New York], of whom at least one will not believe
that the natural right of man to personal liberty supercedes all posi-
tive laws to the contrary. The most that the claimant can expect is a
hung jury; and this is the very thing that the slave will desire, for he
pays no court charges, and is supported, in the mean time, at his
master's cost.4
3
Even in cases that did not involve the great moral questions of
the day, or egregious misuse of legislative or executive power, jury
nullification was understood to permit leniency or mercy in individual
cases for which the defendant might not otherwise be eligible under
the law. "A jury ... [is] like a cylinder head gasket. Between two
things that don't give any, you have to have something that does give
a little, something to seal the law to the facts. There isn't any known
way to legislate with an allowance for right feeling." 44
Although historically it was widely recognized that juries had the
right to judge both the facts and the law, jury nullification in this
country has always been regarded as a power that should be used only
sparingly. One reason for this restraint is the recognition, which
developed over time as legal training for judges became more com-
mon, that judges are generally more knowledgeable of the law than
lay jurors, and thus their instructions to the jury ordinarily should be
given deference. As John Jay explained to the jury in Georgia v.
Brailsford,45 "on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best
judges of the facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court
are the best judges of law. '46 A secondary reason is awareness that
this power can be easily abused, especially if jurors are swayed by
prejudice or bias, as was thought to be the case in acquittals by
Southern juries of individuals tried for civil rights violations during
the 1960s.47
The inclination to maintain judicial authority over jury decision
making grew steadily in the nineteenth century as the new country
became increasingly confident that its novel experiment in represen-
tative democracy would survive. After all, if the law is enacted and
43. Virginia and New-York Controversy, 3 S.Q. REV. 340 (1843). We thank Professor
David Warrington, Librarian for Special Collections, Harvard Law School Library, for
discovering this early usage of the term "hung jury."
44. JAMES G. COZZENS, THE JUST AND THE UNJUST 427 (1942).
45. 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
46. Id. at 4.
47. But see CONRAD, supra note 3, at 167-86 (arguing that factors other than Southern
jurors' racial biases, such as the unwillingness of Southern police and district attorneys to
vigorously investigate and prosecute civil rights offenders, were responsible for acquittals).
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executed by government officials who are accountable to the citizenry
through the electoral process, there is little need for those citizens to
nullify the law in their capacity as trial jurors.41 This becomes a
particularly important point when the act of nullification is expressed
not as an outright acquittal by the jury as a whole, but rather as a veto
by a minority of jurors on arriving at any verdict at all. As one
commentator noted, "[w]hatever may be the virtues of the dissenters'
veto as a tool of empowerment ... the fact is that, with respect to
every case in which the veto is exercised, the will of the community -
embodied in the jury - has not been carried out. 49
Under this reasoning, a number of federal and state court deci-
sions throughout the nineteenth century gradually eroded the rights
of jurors to decide the law.50 There was a tacit recognition that jurors
have the power to nullify the law, but that the power is coupled with a
moral obligation to follow the law as instructed by the judge. The
U.S. Supreme Court explicitly adopted this view in its opinion in
Sparf v. United States.5
What the jury have a right to do, and what are the grounds and
principles upon which they are in duty and conscience bound to act
and govern themselves in the exercise of that right, are two very
distinct questions.... Suppose they have a right to find a general
verdict, and by that verdict to conclude the prosecutor in the matter
of law, still it is an open and very different question, whether, in
making up that verdict and thereby embracing the law, they have
the same right to exercise their own reason and judgment, against
the statement of the law by the judge, to adjudicate on the law, as
unquestionably they have on the fact.52
With this view now firmly established, it became the practice of
judges not only to instruct juries that they were morally bound to
follow judges' instructions on the law, but also to consider the will-
ingness of jurors to abide by the law as a basic criterion for jury
service.53 Those who were not willing to forswear their power to
48. Id. at 93.
49. Richard H. Menard, Jr., Ten Reasonable Men, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179, 193 (2001).
50. For a summary of case law, see Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
51. Id. at 106 ("It was the duty of the court to expound the law and that of the jury to apply
the law as thus declared to the facts as ascertained by them.").
52. Id. at 81 (emphasis omitted).
53. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616-17 (2d Cir. 1997):
[E]very day in courtrooms across the length and breadth of this country, jurors are
dismissed from the venire "for cause" precisely because they are unwilling or unable to
follow the applicable law. Indeed, one of the principal purposes of voir dire is to en-
sure that the jurors ultimately selected for service are unbiased and willing and able to
apply the law as instructed by the court....
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disregard the law could be dismissed from jury service for good
cause .
5 4
But recent case law on jury nullification makes clear that re-
moval after the jury has been sworn is easier said than done, as it is
often difficult to differentiate between a juror who intentionally
disregards the law and a juror who genuinely has doubts about the
evidentiary value of trial testimony. In United States v. Thomas,"5 for
example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a convic-
tion that resulted after the trial judge removed one of the deliberating
jurors on the grounds that the juror intended to engage in jury
nullification.
The facts in Thomas are worth describing, as they illustrate some
of the difficulties inherent in judicial attempts to police jury nullifica-
tion. Several members of the Thomas family were convicted in
federal court of drug charges after the trial judge removed one of the
jurors (Juror No. 5) during deliberations on the ground that the juror
was deliberately disregarding his instructions on the law. 56 All of the
defendants were black, as was Juror No. 5.57 The prosecutor at-
tempted to remove this juror, the only remaining black juror in the
pool, using a peremptory challenge, but the trial judge, misapplying
the Batson rule, denied the government's peremptory challenge.58
This juror reportedly caused problems during the trial, as a group of
six other jurors complained about him to the courtroom clerk and
later to the judge.59 The jurors complained "that Juror No. 5 was
distracting them in court by squeaking his shoe against the floor,
rustling cough drop wrappers in his pocket, and showing agreement
with points made by defense counsel by slapping his leg and, occa-
sionally during the defense summations, saying '[y]eah, yes."' 60
The judge met individually with each of the jurors, including Ju-
ror No. 5, to inquire about Juror No. 5's behavior or any other
problems.61 Juror No. 5 assured the judge that he would follow the
54. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 91-93
(4th ed. 1996) (listing standard voir dire questions).
55. 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
56. Id. at 608-09.
57. Id. at 609.
58. [d.
59. Id. at 609-10.




legal instructions and attempt to be less distracting.62 However, new
troubles emerged during jury deliberation. Juror No. 5 voted for
acquittal and indicated that he would not change his mind, causing
some of the other jurors to complain again.63 During a second set of
juror interviews, the judge learned of an episode of feigned vomiting
by Juror No. 5 and a claim that Juror No. 5 almost struck another
juror.64 Among the jurors, there was a diversity of views about the
basis for Juror No. 5's verdict preference, with some jurors believing
it was based on his opposition to drug laws and others seeing it as a
response to the evidence. 65 Nonetheless, the judge removed Juror No.
5, on the ground that he was not following the legal instructions. 6
The remaining eleven jurors convicted most of the defendants of most
of the charges, and the case was appealed. 67
The appellate court agreed that a juror's refusal to follow the law
is a legally permissible reason to dismiss a juror, even after jury
deliberations have commenced.68 But the court, noting the impropri-
ety of court inquiry into the opinions of individual jurors during
deliberations, 69 adopted as a rule of law that "if the record evidence
discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from the
juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence, the court
must deny the request."70 There was an open question about whether
Juror No. 5's decision in the case reflected his unwillingness to follow
the law or his view that the evidence was insufficient.7" The appellate
court pointed out that when a strong majority of jurors favors convic-
tion, that majority might become convinced that the jurors who favor
acquittal are being unreasonable and unwilling to follow the law.7" It
concluded that without clear evidence of nullification, which would be
admittedly difficult to obtain, it was impermissible to remove Juror
No. 5 after deliberations had begun.7 3
62. Id.
63. Id. at611.




68. Id. at 617 ("[A] presiding judge possesses both the responsibility and the authority to
dismiss a juror whose refusal or unwillingness to follow the applicable law becomes known to
the judge during the course of trial.").
69. Id. at 618.
70. Id. at 621-22 (quoting United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
71. Id. at 624.
72. Id. at 622.
73. Id. at 623-24.
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The California Supreme Court used similar reasoning to reach a
different result, affirming a juror's removal and subsequent jury
conviction in People v. Williams.74 The distinction in that case was
that the juror in question was decidedly more explicit during in
camera discussions with the trial judge that he disagreed with the law
making sexual intercourse with a minor a criminal offense." After
receiving a message from the jury foreperson, the trial judge engaged
in a lengthy discussion with Juror No. 10 about his obligation to
follow the law as instructed by the judge.76
THE COURT: [I]t's been reported to me that you refuse to follow
my instructions on the law in regard to rape and unlawful sexual
intercourse, that you believe the law to be wrong and, therefore,
you will not hear any discussion on that subject. Is that correct?
JUROR: Pretty much, yes.
THE COURT: All right. Are you governed by what was said dur-
ing argument by counsel?
JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand that there was an improper sugges-
tion and that it's a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct?
JUROR: No, I don't know that.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm telling you that's what it was.
And I would remind you too that you took an oath at the outset of
the case in the following language: "Do you and each of you under-
stand and agree that you will well and truly try the cause now pend-
ing before this Court and a true verdict render according only to
the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the Court."
You understand that if you would not follow the instructions that
have been given to you by the court that you would be violating
that oath? Do you understand that?
JUROR: I understand that.
THE COURT: Well, you understand that statutory rape or unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse has been described to you as a misdemeanor?
Did you follow that in the instructions?
JUROR: I've been told it is a misdemeanor. I still don't see - if it
were a $10 fine, I just don't see convicting a man and staining his
record for the rest of his life. I think that is wrong. I'm sorry,
Judge.
74. 21 P.3d 1209 (Cal. 2001).




THE COURT: What you're saying is not the law either concerning
that particular aspect.
JUROR: I'm trying as best I can, Judge. And I'm willing to follow
all the rules and regulations on the entire rest of the charges, but on
that particular charge, I just feel duty-bound to object.
THE COURT: So you're not willing then to follow your oath?
JUROR: That is correct.
Relying on the court's statutory authority to remove jurors for good
cause shown,77 the trial judge discharged the juror and replaced him
with an alternate.
Although Bushell's Case established the principle of jurors' im-
munity from prosecution for returning a verdict according to con-
science, 7s some judges have nonetheless attempted to impose
punishment on alleged nullifiers, not explicitly for their verdict, but
rather on the basis that such jurors violated their oath to follow the
law or to disclose to the court their reluctance to do so. One case that
gained widespread notoriety with proponents of jury nullification
nationwide was People v. Kriho,79 in which the prosecution filed
obstruction of justice charges against a juror who, during voir dire,
failed to reveal her involvement in the marijuana legalization move-
ment as well as a past arrest for drug possession. Laura Kriho was the
sole juror holdout in a drug possession trial, one eventually declared a
mistrial."" The trial court found "that Kriho had intended to obstruct
the judicial process and that her actions had prevented the seating of
a fair and impartial jury."'" Relying heavily on the Thomas12 decision,
the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the contempt charges and
remanded for a new trial.83 The court reasoned that the trial court
had impermissibly based its decision on the testimony of other jurors
about Kriho's alleged motivation to nullify the law, rather than on
any evidence or testimony by Kriho herself.84
The Kriho case presents a dramatic example of the political is-
sues inherent in nullification that arise in the context of jury deadlock.
For instance, a recent article in the New York Times claims that
77. CAL. PENALCODE § 1089 (2001).
78. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
79. 996 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
80. Id. at 163.
81. Id. at 164.
82. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
83. Kriho, 996 P.2d at 166-70.
84. Id. at 165.
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conflict and tempers are inflamed in some juries due to controversial
issues such as death penalty laws, "three strikes" laws, or New York's
Rockefeller-era drug laws.8 Observers of the Kriho case viewed it as
a test of the justice system's resolve to enforce juror adherence to the
law, even though the jury's power to nullify enjoys historical respect
as an appropriate exercise of democratic rights. 6
III. A GLIMPSE OF NULLIFICATION AT WORK? AN NCSC STUDY
OF HUNG JURIES
High-profile cases such as the ones discussed above have fueled
speculation about the extent to which jury nullification occurs and its
potential impact on the integrity of the criminal justice system. As
Thomas makes clear, however, the secrecy of jury deliberations
makes it extremely difficult to determine with any certainty the
reasons why juries decide cases the way they do. In 1998, the NCSC
obtained a unique opportunity to investigate this question with a
grant from the National Institute of Justice to examine the frequency
and various causes of hung juries.87 One method employed for this
research effort was an in-depth study of 372 felony trials in four large,
urban courts.88 Using surveys of judges, attorneys, and jurors, we
examined case characteristics, interpersonal dynamics during delib-
erations, and juror demographics and attitudes, and then compared
these factors in cases in which the jury reached a verdict to cases in
which the jury deadlocked on one or more charges. 9 We also con-
ducted a detailed case study of the forty-six cases from the sample in
which the jury hung on one or more charges.90
85. Katherine E. Finkelstein, Tempers Seem To Be Growing Shorter in Many Jury Rooms,
N.Y. TIMES, AUG. 3, 2001, at BI.
86. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Using the Jury Box as a Soap Box, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr.
4,1999, at GI:
There is real potential danger if [jury nullification] goes unchecked.... I've seen what
happens when ordinary citizens sit on a jury with someone who nullifies. You hear it
in their comments. There is a real loss of faith. And for those who are regularly a part
of the court system, there is a real cynicism that grows out of nullification.
(Quoting Deputy U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.).
87. National Institute of Justice Grant No. 98-IJ-CX-0048 (Aug. 7, 1998).
88. The four courts were the Central Division, Criminal, of the Superior Court of
California, Los Angeles County; the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County (Phoenix);
the Bronx County Supreme Court (New York); and the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 17, at 29.
89. The response rates were fairly high for all survey types-91% for judges, 72% for
prosecutors, 69% for defense counsel, and approximately 80% for jurors. Id. at 32. For a
detailed description of the data collection methods, see id. at 29-40.
90. Id. at 75-81.
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Because jury nullification has frequently been alleged as a prin-
cipal cause of hung juries, we were especially interested in examining
case characteristics and jury factors that are often presumed to be
associated with nullification, such as race and ethnicity, religiosity,
opinions about the fairness of law, and attitudes toward the police,
the courts, and crime in the community. In addition to examining
hung juries, we also examined those factors in our review of individ-
ual jurors' actual votes on the most serious charge during delibera-
tions and their personal verdict preferences.
A. Survey Methods
For a number of reasons, we had to approach the issue of jury
nullification indirectly, rather than directly, in the juror surveys. First,
the fact that we were conducting this research with actual jurors
posed a challenge. To preserve the privacy of surveyed jurors and the
confidentiality of the research data, we had to be cautious not to
include any questions to which a particular response would provide a
prima facie basis for an appeal, which a direct question about jury
nullification certainly would.91 We were also concerned that a direct
question-such as, "In rendering your verdict, did you intentionally
disregard the law and follow your own conscience about what was
right?"-would be unlikely to generate a truthful response from
jurors who had, in fact, done so.92 Indeed, some psychologists would
argue that it is unlikely that the majority of jurors would be able to
say with any certainty which specific factors led them to their deci-
sion. 93
Second, the challenges that scholars face in attempting to define
jury nullification also confronted us as we considered the types of
questions we might ask, within the above constraints, about jury
fairness and nullification matters. We decided to frame several
questions for jurors based on the taxonomy of jury nullification
developed by Professor Darryl Brown. 94 The types of jury nullifica-
tion that Brown identified included acquittals due to the jurors'
91. Id. at 30.
92. See generally Don Dillman et al., Understanding Differences in People's Answers to
Telephone and Mail Surveys, 70 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION 45-61 (1996) (discussing
the impact of social desirability on survey response methods and analysis).
93. See R. E. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (1980).
94. Brown, supra note 20.
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perceptions of unfair laws, unjust applications of fair laws, misconduct
by the State, and juror bias and prejudice.,, To examine the issue of
jury nullification in hung juries, we incorporated questions related to
Brown's categories into the juror surveys that were intended to
capture jurors' views about the case. Focusing on the first two
categories of unfair laws or the unjust application of otherwise fair
laws, we developed four specific questions:
(1) How fair do you think the law was in this case?
(2) To what extent were you worried about the consequences to the
defendant of a conviction by this jury?
(3) In some trials, a strict application of the law might not seem to
produce the fairest possible outcome. In this trial, how fair
would you say the legally correct outcome was?
(4) In some trials, the consequences of a conviction might seem ei-
ther too harsh or too lenient for the particular case and defen-
dant. How lenient or harsh do you think the consequences of a
conviction were likely to be in this case?
Jurors responded to each question on a scale of 1 to 7, with a 1
corresponding to the lowest or most negative response (e.g., not at all
fair, not at all worried, too lenient) and a 7 corresponding to the
highest or most positive response (e.g., very fair, a great deal, too
harsh).
To assess whether misconduct by the state led to jury nullifica-
tion (a third form of jury nullification identified by Brown), we asked
general questions about jurors' trust and confidence in the courts and
the police in their local communities, and specific questions about the
credibility of police evidence in the cases they decided. We did not
include a specific question about prosecutorial misconduct. As for
juror biases and prejudices, we compared judge and jury assessments
of evidence strength with jury verdicts to estimate the extent to which
jury decisions were consistent with the evidence, and looked at the
extent to which demographic variables were related to jury outcomes.
B. Research Findings
In our examination of hung juries, we identified three critical as-
pects of felony jury trials that are related to the likelihood that a jury
will hang: (1) the evidentiary characteristics of the case; (2) the
interpersonal dynamics of deliberations; and (3) jurors' opinions
95. Id. at 1171-98.
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about the fairness of the law as applied during the trial.96 Multivariate
analyses as well as the case studies component confirmed that all
three of these aspects contribute to the likelihood of jury deadlock,
although not necessarily in all jurisdictions. 97 In our inquiry about the
possibility of jury nullification, the fact that juror concerns about the
fairness of a particular law was a significant predictor of hung juries
deserves greater attention. How much did jurors' responses to those
questions differ according to case outcome? Does the type of case
make a difference? To what extent do juror characteristics affect
jurors' opinions about the fairness of the law (legal fairness) or
fairness of the legally correct outcome (outcome fairness)?
The first point to make is that, in contrast to those who fear ram-
pant jury nullification of the law, jurors in these felony trials gave
generally positive ratings about both legal fairness (mean 5.7 on a 7-
point scale, where 7 represents very fair) and outcome fairness (mean
5.3). Jurors also viewed the consequences for the defendant as
neither overly lenient nor overly harsh (mean 4.3), and were only
moderately concerned about the consequences of a conviction (mean
3.4).98 Responses to the questions about legal fairness and outcome
fairness were strongly correlated. 99  However, surprisingly, the
questions about legal fairness were not consistently or strongly
related to jurors' views about the consequences or harshness of a
conviction. 100
Importantly, perceptions of legal fairness varied with the jury's
verdict in the case. Juries that acquitted on the majority of charges
and juries that hung rated legal fairness of the law as significantly
lower than juries that convicted on all or most charges. (See Table 1)
They were also less worried about the consequences of a conviction
for the defendant. All three categories of jurors reported significantly
different views of outcome fairness. Conviction jurors had the
96. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 17. at 44-47, 50-55, 58, 67-69.
97. Id. at 58-62. In the District of Columbia, group dynamics during deliberations was the
only significant variable related to juror deadlock. Id.
98. Id. at 58.
99. We calculated each jury's average response to each of the fairness questions, and then
performed correlational analyses on these average responses. Pearson correlation statistic =
.622, p < .001. Juries that rated the fairness of the law positively also saw the legally correct
outcome in the case as fair.
100. The two consequences questions were significantly related (r = .39, p = .001). The
leniency/harshness question was unrelated to the legal fairness and outcome fairness questions.
The question about concern for the defendant was unrelated to the outcome fairness question,
and slightly but significantly (r = .17, p = .001) related to the legal fairness question.
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highest ratings at 5.7, acquittal jurors reported a lower rating of 5.1,
and hung jurors had the lowest rating at 4.6, suggesting that attitudes
about legal fairness may influence case outcomes either singly or in
conjunction with other factors.
Table 1:








How fair was the law in this
case?
Worried about consequences
of conviction for defendant?
How fair was the legally
correct outcome?
Consequences for defendant
too lenient or harsh?
6.0 5.2 5.3 36.914 ***
3.6 3.3 3.2 7.402 **
5.7 4.6 5.1 40.624 ***




Given these differences, are particular case characteristics re-
lated to juries' perceptions of fairness in the law? A review of
different types of cases revealed average ratings above the midpoint
(4) for all case types, regardless of the trial outcome. (See Table 2)
We see the same overall pattern of lower ratings of legal fairness in
hung and acquittal juries across the different case types.101
101. We undertook an analysis of variance with the trial outcome (conviction, acquittal, any
hung) and the case type as independent variables and the jury's collective perception of legal
fairness as the dependent variable. The trial outcome was statistically significant, F (2, 302) =
12.69, p < .0001, but the type of case was not.
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Table 2:


















We also investigated juror characteristics that might contribute
to views about the fairness of the law. Using univariate analyses, we
found a number of variables that were significantly related to juries'
perceptions of legal fairness, including location,102 race (African-
American only),103 trust in the police,1 4 and trust in the courts.05
Using linear regression to control for multiple variables simultane-
ously, we found that all four factors continue to be significant predic-
tors of jury ratings of legal fairness. 1°6 (See Table 3)107
102. Jurors in Los Angeles had the highest ratings for legal fairness (5.93), followed by
jurors in Maricopa County (5.73), D.C. (5.53), and Bronx County (5.51). F (3, 355) = 4.535, p -
.004.
103. Pearson correlation statistic = -.229, p < .001. As the percentage of African-American
jurors increases on juries, the average jury rating of legal fairness decreases. There was no
significant correlation between legal fairness and non-African-American categories of
race/ethnicity.
104. Pearson correlation statistic = .344, p < .001. As jury ratings of trust in police increased,
jury ratings of legal fairness increased.
105. Pearson correlation statistic = .360, p < .001. As jury ratings of trust in the courts
increased, jury ratings of legal fairness increased.
106. Location is only significant in Los Angeles.









Los Angeles 0.163 1.320 *
Race/Ethnicity
Percent African-American 0.196 1.689 *
Percent Hispanic -0.059 0.524
Percent Asian-Pacific Islander -0.001 0.006
Trust in police 0.274 3.639 ***




Similarly, we examined juries' perceptions of outcome fairness
and found that location;10 8 race (African-American only);10 9 the
complexity1 ° and ambiguity "1 of the evidence including the relative
ease or difficulty in understanding the evidence;,112 expert testi-
mony'1 3 and instructions;114 the importance"' and credibility"
6 of
108. Like perceptions of legal fairness generally, juries in Los Angeles had the highest
ratings for outcome fairness (5.56), followed by juries in Maricopa County (5.50), Bronx County
(5.28), and D.C. (5.09). F (3, 355) = 5.303, p = .001.
109. Pearson's correlation statistic= -. 169, p = .001. As the percentage of African-American
jurors increases on juries, the average jury rating of outcome fairness decreases.
110. Pearson's correlation statistic= -.163, p = .002. As juries' perceptions of case complex-
ity increase, their ratings of outcome fairness decrease.
111. Pearson's correlation statistic = -.265, p < .001. As juries' perceptions of evidence
ambiguity increase, their ratings of outcome fairness decrease.
112. Pearson's correlation statistic = .393, p < .001. As juries' comprehension of evidence
increases, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
113. Pearson's correlation statistic = .250, p < .001. As juries' comprehension of expert
testimony increases, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
114. Pearson's correlation statistic = .221, p < .001. As juries' comprehension of the law
increases, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
115. Pearson's correlation statistic= .141,p = .008. As juries' assessments of the importance
of police testimony increase, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
116. Pearson's correlation statistic = .171, p = .001. As juries' assessments of police
credibility increase, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
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police testimony; the credibility of victim testimony;"' juries' percep-
tions that they had heard all of the relevant evidence ;118 juries' trust in
the police 19 and in the courts;120 and juries' perceptions about com-
munity crime levels were all statistically significant. 2' When they are
examined simultaneously using linear regression, however, only
juries' trust in the courts, ambiguity of the evidence, perceptions that
they have heard all of the relevant evidence, and relative ease or
difficulty in understanding the evidence are significant predictors of
their perceptions of outcome fairness.2 2 (See Table 4) Indeed, it is
striking that only those variables related to evidentiary characteristics
of the case, and the juries' assessments of the courts, are predictive of
their perceptions of outcome fairness. Race, the factor to which jury
nullification is often attributed, loses its statistical significance when
multiple factors are considered simultaneously.
117. Pearson's correlation statistic = .114, p = .040. As juries' assessment of victim
credibility increase, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
118. Pearson's correlation statistic = .369, p < .001. As juries' perceptions that they had
heard all of the relevant evidence increase, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
119. Pearson's correlation statistic = .284, p < .001. As juries' trust in the police increases,
their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
120. Pearson's correlation statistic = .315, p < .001. As juries' trust in the courts increases,
their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
121. Pearson's correlation statistic = .118, p = .025. As juries' concern about community
crime levels increases, their ratings of outcome fairness increase.
122. We first tested a regression model using all of the variables that were significantly
correlated using univariate analysis methods and identified those variables that were significant
predictors of outcome fairness. We then developed a second model, shown in Table 4, that
omits variables other than race that were not significant predictors of outcome fairness. Race
variables were retained in the model due to their theoretical importance in discussions of jury




Impact of Jury and Case Characteristics on Opinions of Outcome Fairness
Beta t-value
Race
Percent African-American 0.009 -0.174
Percent Hispanic 0.046 0.914
Percent Asian-Pacific Islander 0.057 1.197
All relevant evidence presented 0.222 4.399 *
Ease/Difficulty in understanding evidence 0.199 3.530 **
Ambiguity of evidence -0.126 -2.445 *




Discovery of the factors associated with jurors' perceptions of le-
gal fairness provides valuable insights. However, how much do those
perceptions actually affect jury verdicts? The NCSC study found that
juror concerns about fairness contributed significantly to the inci-
dence of jury deadlock, but that evidentiary factors and dynamics of
jury deliberations were also significant contributors.123 Is the same
true for juries that acquit on all or most charges? Using a logistic
regression with the likelihood of an acquittal as the dependent
variable, we find that similar factors account for those verdicts as well.
(See Table 5) The direction and weight of the evidence, jurors'
perceptions that they have heard all of the relevant evidence, the
credibility of police and defendant testimony, and the fairness of the
law are all significant predictors of whether a jury will acquit.
123. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 17, at 83-88.
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Table 5:
Factors Affecting Jury Verdicts to Acquit
B Wald
Weight and direction of evidence 0.531 16.266 ***
All relevant evidence presented -0.791 18.028 ***
Police credibility -0:460 7.167 **
Defendant credibility 0.566 16.755 ***
Location




Percent African-American 0.306 0.084
Percent Hispanic -1.787 2.168
Percent Asian-Pacific Islander -2.485 0.654




C. Perceptions of Fairness of the Law, Evidence Strength, and Jury
Verdicts
The jury's collective sense of the fairness of the law it is asked to
apply to the facts in the case, then, is often related to the jury's
verdict. However, finding an association between jury verdicts and
the perceived fairness of the law is not discovering the smoking gun of
jury nullification. It could be incidental to other factors in the case.
We would have more evidence of possible nullification if we discov-
ered that the evidence in a case was evaluated by the jury or the judge
as compelling for the prosecution, the jury hung or acquitted, and
rated legal fairness was low.
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The NCSC hung jury research project solicited judge, attorney,
and juror ratings of evidence strength, so that we were able to identify
a small set of cases in which judges and jurors rated the evidence as
strongly favoring the prosecution yet the jury acquitted or hung. The
NCSC's case study analysis found that juror fairness concerns played
some role in twelve of forty-six cases in which the jury hung on one or
more charges. 2 4 In nine of those cases, however, multiple factors
contributed to jury deadlock and in only four of the nine was legal or
outcome fairness determined to be the primary factor.1 5 Juror
fairness concerns appeared to be the sole factor in only three of the
forty-six cases.126
For our nullification analysis, we examined the set of cases in
which members of the jury rated the case as extremely strong for the
prosecution (less than or equal to 2 where 1 represented evidence
strongly favoring the prosecution). Jury ratings are particularly
significant if, as Professor Nancy Marder argues, jurors must intend to
nullify. If they see the evidence as ambiguous or misinterpret the law,
Marder would not credit them with nullification. 127 Table 6 displays
the number of cases in which the jury or judge rated the evidence as
strongly favoring the prosecution, the outcomes in these cases, and
the number of cases with majority acquittal or hung jury outcomes
that had low jury ratings of fairness.
124. Id. at 76, tbl. 6.1.
125. Id. at 76, 78.
126. Id. at 78.
127. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, supra note 3.
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Table 6:
Potential Nullification Cases: Evidence Ratings and Case Outcomes
Jury Trial Outcome
Cases with Potential
• -- 0 .-
Evidence Strong " Nullification
Rating Prosecution 2 r-0 0 Cases
Evidence 0 C
Jury rating 53 46 2 4 1 2
Judge rating 126 82 14 18 12 7
Let us first look at the cases in which the jury rated the evidence
as strongly favoring the prosecution, the top set of entries in Table 6.
Using the collective jury judgments, we find that juries rated a total of
fifty-three cases as strongly favoring the prosecution. Of these, forty-
six resulted in convictions on the majority of the charges, and two
additional cases resulted in a combination of convictions and acquit-
tals on multiple charges. Another jury decided eighteen charges
against two defendants, convicting on twelve and hanging on the
remaining six. Although a hung outcome on some charges may
suggest possible nullification, the twelve convictions are very consis-
tent with the jury's evidence rating. In addition, the rated fairness of
the law in this case was 5.09 on a 7-point scale, close to the overall
mean rating of legal fairness of 5.7, suggesting it was not a major
factor in the decision. That leaves us with four acquittals in this group
which constitute our most likely potential nullification cases. When
we examine the juries' ratings of the fairness of the law in these cases,
the average is close to the overall mean, but the rated legal fairness
ranges from a high of 6.75, to 6.5, to 4.5, and to a low of 4.0. Similarly,
the outcome fairness is rated 6.5 and 6.2 in two cases, but 4.0 in the
other two cases.
There are two cases, then, in which the legal fairness and out-
come fairness ratings are substantially lower than the overall means.
These two cases suggest that jurors were particularly concerned about
the consequences of a conviction for the defendant. One was a drug
sales case in which the defendant was convicted of one offense and
acquitted of two others, yet still received a prison sentence between
five and ten years. Jurors rated the police evidence as important but
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not very believable. Jurors indicated a substantial amount of concern
over the harshness of the probable sentence. Thus, the verdict in this
case might have reflected poor police work as well as worry about the
consequences for the defendant.
The second case involved sexual assault in which neither the de-
fendant nor the victim was rated as very sympathetic. There were six
counts, and jurors acquitted on five of the six. Jurors indicated they
were worried about the consequences to the defendant of a convic-
tion. Interestingly, although jurors saw the case as strong for the
prosecution, the judge rated the evidence in this case as favoring the
defense, hinting at evidence problems.
Judges also rated the strength of evidence in the cases. While
not as ideal as juror ratings for identifying potential instances of
nullification, judge ratings reflect an experienced legal expert's view
of the case and thus are of interest. 28 The cases in which the judge
rated the prosecution's case as strong are provided on the second line
of entries in Table 6. Judges rated a total of 126 cases as strongly
favoring the prosecution, that is, a 1 or 2 on a 7-point scale. Eighty-
two of these resulted in convictions on the majority of the charges,
and another fourteen resulted in mixed convictions and acquittals. In
eighteen trials, the jury acquitted on most charges, and in another
twelve the jury hung. Combining the eighteen majority acquittals and
the twelve hung juries leaves us with a set of thirty trials in which the
judge rated the evidence as strongly favoring the prosecution but the
jury did not convict on most or all charges. 2 9 There could be multiple
reasons why judge and jury might diverge, but one potential reason is
the jury's concern about fairness. These thirty trials, then, constitute
another potential place to look for evidence of jury nullification.
Of the thirty trials, seven have an average juror rating of legal
fairness less than 5.0 and are the most promising candidates for jury
nullification. The first striking discovery is that in every one of these
cases in which the judge concluded the evidence strongly favored the
prosecution, the jurors saw the evidence as more ambiguous. Four of
128. Judge, attorney, and jury ratings of the strength of evidence in the case are significantly
correlated, but not perfectly; correlations ranged from .36 to .44, all p's < .001. HANNAFORD-
AGOR ET AL., supra note 17, at 47-48 n.122. Jury nullification is only one of the reasons why
judges and juries might disagree about the outcome of a case. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 104-17 (1966); Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The
American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991).
129. The overlap between the thirty judge-rated cases and five jury-rated cases consisted of
only two cases, neither of which had legal fairness ratings that might suggest possible jury
nullification.
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the cases were drug possession or drug sales cases. In one of them, a
case that ended in a hung jury, the judge attributed the hung jury
outcome to police evidence that was not credible. In an assault case
and a forgery case, police evidence also appeared to be problematic
for the jury, judging by the juror ratings. In addition, there were
some hints from the responses of judges and jurors that in some of
these cases not all the relevant evidence had been presented at the
trial. Thus, in this set of seven cases, although concerns about fair-
ness or pre-existing doubts may have played a role in the acquittals
and hung juries, they were combined with other factors.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions can be drawn from this glimpse of jury decision
making about the extent to which nullification takes place in felony
trials? Certainly one of the first lessons is the challenge of identifying
instances of nullification, both theoretically and empirically. The
survey methods that were employed in this study were only able to
address the issue of jury nullification indirectly, making our conclu-
sions necessarily tentative. Using Brown's taxonomy of jury nullifica-
tion as a theoretical basis, the NCSC study asked jurors about their
perceptions of legal and outcome fairness. It is important to recog-
nize, however, that attitudes do not equal actions; we cannot draw
firm conclusions that the jurors who acquitted the defendant or hung
the jury intentionally disregarded the law based on the fact that they
rated the fairness of the law lower than jurors who convicted the
defendant. At best, we can only infer that juror opinions about the
fairness of the law may have affected their verdicts.
That said, it is clear from the NCSC study that juror concerns
about legal fairness and outcome fairness are present to a measurable
extent in hung and acquittal juries. On close examination, however,
we find that they are not the only factors. Evidentiary factors are
particularly important in both acquittal juries and hung juries. In
addition, the dynamics of jury deliberations are strong influences in
hung juries. The combination of so many variables makes it unlikely
that jury nullification plays a dominant role in the large majority of
cases.
A striking aspect of the multivariate analyses is that jurors' per-
ceptions of legal fairness are not clearly tied to juror demographic
characteristics as has often been suggested, but rather are closely
associated with jurors' general views about the legitimacy of commu-
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nity institutions such as the police and the courts. Similarly, outcome
fairness is heavily influenced by evidentiary characteristics, rather
than jury demographics. These features of juror perceptions of
fairness make it seem unlikely that juries are frequently nullifying the
law strictly on preconceived personal notions of justice. Instead, it
seems more likely that attitudes about legal fairness and outcome
fairness affect how jurors perceive and interpret the evidence, which
would be consistent with psychological research on jury decision
making. 30 As a result, as the discussion in United States v. Thomas
explains,", it is difficult for jurors themselves-and even more so for
judges or lawyers-to separate clearly the evidentiary versus the
nullification motives that may underlie jury verdicts. Concerns about
legal fairness are nevertheless a measurable factor in many jury
verdicts, and consequently pose continuing challenges for the criminal
justice system.
130. There is a substantial literature on the extent to which views of justice and fairness
influence jury decision making. For an excellent survey of the literature, see FINKEL, supra note
3.
131. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
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